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Abstract
In this paper we examine implications of model uncertainty due to robustness (RB) for
consumption-saving, market price of uncertainty, and aggregate wealth accumulation under
limited information-processing capacity (rational inattention or RI) in an otherwise standard
permanent income model. We first solve the robust permanent income models with inat-
tentive consumers and show that RI by itself creats an additional demand for robustness that
leads to higher “induced uncertainty” facing consumers. Second, we explore how the induced
uncertainty composed by (i) model uncertainty due to RB and (ii) state uncertainty due to RI,
affects consumption-saving decisions and the market price of uncertainty. Particurly, we find
that induced uncertainty can better explain the observed market price of uncertainty. Further-
more, we explore the observational equivalence between RB and risk-sensitivity (RS) in this
filtering problem. Finally, we evaluate the importance of induced uncertainty and fundamen-
tal uncertainty in determining equilibrium aggregate wealth.
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1. Introduction
Hansen and Sargent (1995) first introduced robustness (RB, a concern for model misspecification)
into linear-quadratic (LQ) economic models.1 In robust control problems, agents do not know the
true data-generating process and are concerned about the possibility that their model (denoted
the approximating model) is misspecified; consequently, they choose optimal decisions as if the
subjective distribution over shocks was chosen by an evil nature in order to minimize their ex-
pected utility.2 Robustness (RB) models produce precautionary savings but remain within the
class of LQ models, which leads to analytical simplicity. A second class of models that produces
precautionary savings but remains within the class of LQ models is the risk-sensitive (RS) model
of Hansen and Sargent (1995) and Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999). In the RS model agents
effectively compute expectations through a distorted lens, increasing their effective risk aversion
by overweighting negative outcomes. The resulting decision rules depend explicitly on the vari-
ance of the shocks, producing precautionary savings, but the value functions are still quadratic
functions of the states. As shown in Hansen and Sargent (2007), the risk-sensitivity preference
can be used to interpret the desire for robustness as they lead to the same consumption-saving
decisions, and similar asset pricing implications.3
Sims (2003) first introduce rational inattention into economics and argued that it is a plausi-
ble method for introducing sluggishness, randomness, and delay into economic models. In his
formulation agents have finite Shannon channel capacity, limiting their ability to process signals
about the true state of the world. As a result, an impulse to the economy induces only gradual
responses by individuals, as their limited capacity requires many periods to discover just how
much the state has moved. Since RI introduces additional uncertainty, the endogenous noise due
to finite capacity, into economic models, RI by itself creates an additional demand for robustness.
In addition, agents with finite capacity need to use a filter to update their perceived state upon
receiving noisy signals, which may lead to another demand for robustness, the robust Kalman
filter.4
In this paper we first construct a robust permanent income model with inattentive consumers
who have two types of concerns about model misspecification: (i) concerns about the distur-
bances to the perceived permanent income (the disturbances here include both the fundamental
1See Hansen and Sargent (2007) for a textbook treatment on robustness and Hansen and Sargent (2010) for a recent
survey.
2The solution to a robust decision-maker’s problem is the equilibrium of a max-min game between the decision-
maker and nature.
3It is worth noting that although both RB (or RS) and CARA preferences (i.e., Caballero 1990 and Wang 2003)
increase the precautionary savings premium via the intercept terms in the consumption functions, they have distinct
implications for the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income (MPC). Specifically, CARA preferences
do not alter the MPC relative to the LQ case, whereas RB or RS increases the MPC. That is, under RB, in response to
a negative wealth shock, the consumer would choose to reduce consumption more than that predicted in the CARA
model (i.e., save more to protect themselves against the negative shock).
4The key assumption in Luo and Young (2010) is that agents with finite capacity distrust their budget constraint, but
still use an ordinary Kalman filter to estimate the true state; in this case, a distortion to the mean of permanent income
is introduced to represent possible model misspecification. However, this case ignores the effect of the RI-induced
noise on the demand for robustness.
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shock and the RI-induced noise shock) and (ii) concerns about the Kalman gain. For ease of
presentation, we will refer to the first type of robustness as Type I and the second as Type II. Af-
ter solving the model explicitly, we first examine how different types of robustness affect optimal
consumption and precautionary savings via interacting with finite capacity. Specifically, we show
that given finite capacity, the two types of robustness have opposing impacts on the marginal
propensity to consume out of perceived permanent income (MPC) and precautionary savings.
For Type I robustness, since agents with low capacity are very concerned about the confluence of
low permanent income and high consumption (meaning they believe their permanent income is
high so they consume a lot and then their new signal indicates that in fact their permanent income
was low), they take actions which reduce the probability of this bad event – they save more.5 As
for Type II robustness, an increase in the strength of this effect increases the Kalman gain, which
leads to lower total uncertainty about the true level of permanent income and then low precau-
tionary savings. In addition, the strength of the precautionary effect is positively related to the
amount of this uncertainty that always increases as finite capacity gets smaller. Using the explicit
expression for consumption dynamics, we also show that increasing Type II robustness increases
the robust Kalman filter gain and thus leads to less relative volatility of consumption to income
(less smooth consumption process). In contrast, Type I robustness increases the relative volatility
of consumption by increasing the MPC out of changes in permanent income.6
Furthermore, we compare the implications of risk-sensitivity and robustness for consumption
and savings when considering both control and filtering decisions of inattentive consumers. In
the risk-sensitive permanent income model with information imperfections due to RI, the clas-
sical Kalman filter that extremizes the expected value of a certain quadratic objective function is
still optimal. After solving the RB and RS models with filtering, we establish the observational
equivalence (OE) conditions between RB and RS. We find that the simple and linear OE between
RB and RS established in Hansen and Sargent (2007) and Luo and Young (2010) no longer holds,
we instead have a complicated and nonlinear OE between RB and RS under RI.
We next investigate the asset pricing implications of RB and RI within the PIH setting. Fol-
lowing Hansen (1987) and Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), we interpret the consumption-
saving decisions in terms of a social planning problem and these decisions are equilibrium alloca-
tions for a competitive equilibrium. We can then deduce asset prices as in the consumption-based
asset pricing literature by finding the shadow prices that clear security markets. Since these as-
set prices include information about the agent’s intertemporal preferences, they measure the risk
and uncertainty aversion of the agent. Given the explicit solutions for consumption and saving
decisions, we can explicitly solve for the market prices of uncertainty under RB and RI.7 We find
that induced uncertainty due to RB and RI significantly increases the market price of risk. The
5Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) apply Type I RB in the SOE-RBC model proposed in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)
and show that this type of RB can help generate realistic relative volatility of consumption to income and the current
account dynamics observed in emerging and developed small-open economies.
6This mechanism is similar to that examined in Luo and Young (2010).
7To explore how induced uncertainty due to RB and RI affects market prices of uncertainty, we follow the procedure
adopted in Epstein and Wang (1994) and Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999).
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mechanism is straightforward to describe. Under RB, the market price of uncertainty is related to
the norm of the worst-case shock (that is, the size of the pessimistic distortion to the underlying
stochastic process for income); adding rational inattention increases the size of these distortions
and therefore amplifies the effect on asset prices. We find that our model, under plausible calibra-
tions of the fear of model misspecification based on detection error probabilities (as in Hansen and
Sargent 2007), produces stochastic discount factors that satisfy the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.
We finally consider an aggregate economy with a continuum of inattentive agents who face
mortality risk and have a preference for robustness. We find that in the steady state equilibrium,
induced uncertainty due to RB and RI affects the level of aggregate wealth in general equilibrium.
Specifically, we show that a proportionate increase in the parameters governing Type I robustness,
Type II robustness, or channel capacity can significantly reduce, increase, and reduce equilibrium
aggregate wealth to income ratio, respectively. Induced uncertainty generates a precautionary
savings motive and also increases the propensity to consume out of income increases; in general
equilibrium these two effects exactly cancel in the absence of growth. When the endowment
grows over time, however, induced uncertainty can produce higher or lower aggregate wealth,
depending on how these various forces add up.
2. Robust Control and Filtering under Rational Inattention
2.1. A Rational Inattention Version of the Standard Permanent Income Model
In this section we consider a rational inattention (RI) version of the standard permanent income
model. In the standard permanent income model (Hall 1978, Sargent 1978, Flavin 1981), house-
holds solve the dynamic consumption-savings problem
v(s0) = max{ct}
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
]
subject to
st+1 = Rst − ct + ζt+1, (1)
where u(ct) = − 12 (c− ct)2 is the period utility function, c > 0 is the bliss point, ct is consumption,
st = bt +
1
R
∞
∑
j=0
R−jEt
[
yt+j
]
(2)
is permanent income, i.e., the expected present value of lifetime resources, consisting of financial
wealth (bt) plus human wealth (i.e., the discounted expected present value of current and future
labor income: 1R ∑
∞
j=0 R
−jEt
[
yt+j
]
),
ζt+1 ≡ 1R
∞
∑
j=t+1
(
1
R
)j−(t+1)
(Et+1 − Et)
[
yj
]
, (3)
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is the time (t + 1) innovation to permanent income, bt is financial wealth (or cash-on-hand), yt is
a labor income process with Gaussian white noise innovations, β is the discount factor, and R > 1
is the constant gross interest rate at which the consumer can borrow and lend freely.8 In this
paper, we assume that income yt takes the following general AR(1) process with the persistence
coefficient ρ ∈ [0, 1],
yt+1 = ρyt + xt + εt+1, (4)
where xt ≡ (g− ρ) gty0 is the growth component, g is the constant gross growth rate of income,
y0 is defined as the initial level of income, and εt+1 is iid with mean 0 and variance ω2.9 Given
this income specification, we have st ≡ bt + 1R−ρyt + 1(R−g)(R−ρ)xt and ζt+1 = εt+1/ (R− ρ), where
and ω2ζ ≡ var (ζt+1) = ω2/ (R− ρ)2.10 Finally, financial wealth (b) follows the process
bt+1 = Rbt + yt − ct. (5)
This specification follows that in Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981) and implies that optimal consump-
tion is determined by permanent income:
ct =
(
R− 1
βR
)
st − 1R− 1
(
1− 1
βR
)
c. (6)
We assume for the remainder of this section that βR = 1, since this setting is the only one that
implies zero drift in consumption under rational expectations. Under this assumption the model
leads to the well-known random walk result of Hall (1978):
∆ct+1 = (R− 1) ζt+1; (7)
the change in consumption depends neither on the past history of labor income nor on anticipated
changes in labor income. We also point out the well-known result that the standard PIH model
with quadratic utility implies the certainty equivalence property holds: uncertainty has no effect
on consumption, so that there is no precautionary saving.
To motivate what follows, we now remind readers why (7) is inadequate as an empirical
representation of consumption. There are many routes we could take here; we choose to follow
Campbell and Deaton (1989) and run a simple bivariate VAR of (demeaned) labor income growth
and the (demeaned) saving rate out of labor income, obtaining[
∆ log (yt)− µy
st
yt − µs
]
=
[
0.0287 0.4686
0.9397 0.1429
] [
∆ log (yt−1)− µy
st−1
yt−1 − µs
]
+
[
u1,t
u2,t
]
.
The data we use is quarterly NIPA data on total compensation of employees and gross saving
8We only require that yt and R are such that permanent income is finite.
9Note that when g = 1, this specification reduces to yt+1 = ρyt + (1− ρ) y0 + εt+1, one of the most popular income
specifications in the consumption literature.
10For the rest of the paper we will restrict attention to points where ct < c, so that utility is increasing and concave.
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deflated using the PCE deflator, from 1947Q1-2013Q2. Campbell and Deaton (1989) show that
the coefficient matrix should have the form[
δ 0
δ τ−1
]
(8)
where τ 6= 0 is the effective discount rate for future cash flows (the growth-adjusted interest
rate); this matrix embodies both a test of "excess sensitivity" (that consumption responds to pre-
dictable changes in income) and a test of "excess smoothness" (consumption growth does not vary
enough with income growth).11 It is obvious that our estimated matrix is quite far from satisfying
the restrictions embodied in (8).12 One method for attacking these rejections is to assume that
the information set of the agents differs systematically from that of the econometrician; rational
inattention will deliver exactly this feature by assuming the econometrician has more information
than the agents do.
To this end we follow Sims (2003, 2010) and incorporate rational inattention (RI) due to finite
information-processing capacity into the model. Under RI, consumers have only finite Shannon
channel capacity to observe the state of the world. Specifically, we use the concept of entropy
from information theory to characterize the uncertainty about a random variable; the reduction
in entropy is thus a natural measure of information flow.13 With finite capacity κ ∈ (0,∞) , a
variable s following a continuous distribution cannot be observed without error and thus the
information set at time t + 1, It+1, is generated by the entire history of noisy signals
{
s∗j
}t+1
j=0
.
Following the literature, we assume the noisy signal takes the additive form s∗t+1 = st+1 + ξt+1,
where ξt+1 is the endogenous noise caused by finite capacity. We further assume that ξt+1 is an
iid idiosyncratic shock and is independent of the fundamental shock. Agents with finite capacity
will choose a new signal s∗t+1 ∈ I t+1 =
{
s∗1 , s
∗
2 , · · ·, s∗t+1
}
that reduces their uncertainty about the
state variable st+1 as much as possible. Formally, this idea can be described by the information
constraint
H (st+1|It)−H (st+1|It+1)≤ κ, (9)
where κ is the consumer’s information channel capacity, H (st+1| I t) denotes the entropy of the
state prior to observing the new signal at t + 1, and H (st+1| I t+1) is the entropy after observing
the new signal. κ imposes an upper bound on the amount of information – that is, the change
in the entropy – that can be transmitted in any given period. Finally, following the literature, we
11In fact, Campbell and Deaton (1989) show that the two excesses are the same – if consumption responds excessively
to anticipated income changes it necessarily must respond insufficiently to unanticipated ones.
12There are many econometric issues related to running this VAR that we do not attempt to address here, especially
the clearly nonstationarity in the savings rate series (it drifts downward over time). For this reason we do not report
the test statistics for the hypotheses that the first column entries are equal.
13Formally, entropy is defined as the expectation of the negative of the (natural) log of the density function,
−E [ln ( f (s))]. For example, the entropy of a discrete distribution with equal weight on two points is simply
E [ln2 ( f (s))] = −0.5 ln (0.5) − 0.5 ln (0.5) = 0.69, and the unit of information contained in this distribution is 0.69
“nats”. (For alternative bases for the logarithm, the unit of information differs; with log base 2 the unit of information
is the ’bit’ and with base 10 it is a ’dit’ or a ’hartley.’) In this case, an agent can remove all uncertainty about s if the
capacity devoted to monitoring s is κ = 0.69 nats.
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suppose that the prior distribution of st+1 is Gaussian.
Under the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) setting, as has been shown in Sims (2003, 2006),
the true state under RI also follows a normal distribution st|It ∼ N (E [st|It] ,Σt), where Σt =
Et
[
(st − ŝt)2
]
. In addition, given that the noisy signal takes the additive form s∗t+1 = st+1 + ξt+1,
the noise ξt+1 should also be Gaussian. It is worth noting that the Gaussianity of the posterior
variance of the true state and the noise is optimally determined by the LQG structure.14 The
information-processing constraint, (9), can then be reduced to
ln
(
R2Σt +ω2ζ
)
− ln (Σt+1) ≤ 2κ; (10)
Since this constraint is always binding, we can compute the value of the steady state conditional
variance Σ:
Σ =
ω2ζ
exp (2κ)− R2 . (11)
Given this Σ, we can use the usual formula for updating the conditional variance of a Gaussian
distribution Σ to recover the variance of the endogenous noise (Λ):
Λ =
(
Σ−1 −Ψ−1
)−1
, (12)
where Ψ = R2Σ+ ω2ζ is the posterior variance of the state. Finally, the Kalman gain (θ) can be
written as
θ = ΣΛ−1 = 1− 1
exp (2κ)
, (13)
and ŝt is governed by the following Kalman filtering equation
ŝt+1 = (1− θ) (Rŝt − ct) + θ (st+1 + ξt+1) , (14)
given s0 ∼ N (ŝ0,Σ).
As argued in Sims (2010), instead of using fixed finite channel capacity to model limited
information-processing ability, one could assume that the marginal cost of information process-
ing (i.e., the shadow price of information-processing ability) is constant. That is, the Lagrange
multiplier on (10) is constant. In the univariate case, the objective of the agent with finite capacity
in the filtering problem is to minimize E
[
∑∞t=0 βt (st − s∗t )2
]
, subject to the information-processing
constraint, or
min
{Σt}
{
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
Σt + λ ln
(
R2Σt−1 +ω2ζ
Σt
)]}
,
where Σt is the conditional variance at t, λ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to (10), and
we impose the restriction that βR = 1 for simplicity. Solving this problem yields the optimal
14This result is often assumed as a matter of convenience in signal extraction models with exogenous noises, and RI
can rationalize this assumption.
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steady state conditional variance:
Σ =
−
(
1− Rλ˜
)
+
√(
1− λ˜R
)2
+ 4λ˜R2
2R2
ω2ζ , (15)
where λ˜ = λ/ω2ζ is the normalized shadow price of information-processing capacity. It is straight-
forward to show that as λ goes to 0, Σ = 0; and as λ goes to ∞, Σ = ∞. Note that ∂ lnΣ
∂ lnω2ζ
< 1 if we
adopt the assumption that λ is fixed, while ∂ lnΣ
∂ lnω2ζ
= 1 in the fixed κ case. Comparing (15) with
(11), it is clear that the two RI modeling strategies are observationally equivalent in the sense that
they lead to the same conditional variance if the following equality holds:
κ = ln R +
1
2
ln
1+ 2
−
(
1− Rλ˜
)
+
√(
1− λ˜R
)2
+ 4R2λ˜
 . (16)
In this case, the Kalman gain is
θ = 1− 1
R
1+
2
−
(
1− Rλ˜
)
+
√(
1− λ˜R
)2
+ 4R2λ˜

−1
. (17)
It is obvious that κ converges to its lower limit κ = ln (R) ≈ R− 1 as λ goes to∞; and it converges
to ∞ as λ goes to 0. In other words, using this RI modeling strategy, the consumer is allowed to
adjust the optimal level of capacity in such a way that the marginal cost of information-processing
for the problem at hand remains constant. Note that this result is consistent with the concept of
‘elastic’ capacity proposed in Kahneman (1973). From 1, it is also clear that if λ is fixed, an increase
in ω2ζ will lead to more capacity being devoted to monitoring the evolution of the state. Figure (1)
illustrates how κ and θ change with λ when R = 1.03 and ω2ζ = 1.
Note that after substituting (1) into (14), we have an alternative expression of the regular
Kalman filter:
ŝt+1 = Rŝt − ct + ηt+1, (18)
where
ηt+1 = θR (st − ŝt) + θ (ζt+1 + ξt+1) (19)
is the innovation to the mean of the distribution of perceived permanent income,
st − ŝt = (1− θ) ζt1− (1− θ)R · L −
θξt
1− (1− θ)R · L , (20)
and Et [ηt+1] = 0 because the expectation is conditional on the perceived signals and inatten-
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tive agents cannot perceive the lagged shocks perfectly.15 The variance of the innovation to the
perceived state can be written as
ω2η = var (ηt+1) =
θ
1− (1− θ) R2ω
2
ζ ,
which means that ω2η reflects two sources of uncertainty facing the consumer: (i) fundamental
uncertainty, ω2ζ and (ii) induced uncertainty, i.e., state uncertainty due to RI,
[
θ
1−(1−θ)R2 − 1
]
ω2ζ .
Therefore, as κ decreases, the relative importance of induced uncertainty to fundamental uncer-
tainty increases.
In the next section, we will discuss alternative ways to robustify this RI-PIH model and their
different implications for consumption, precautionary savings, and the welfare costs of uncer-
tainty. The RB-RI model proposed here encompasses the hidden state (HS) model discussed in
Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002) and Hansen and Sargent (2005); the main difference is that
agents in the RB-RI model cannot observe the entire state vector perfectly, whereas agents in
the RB-hidden state model can observe some part of the state vector (in particular, the part they
control).
2.2. Concerns about the Fundamental Shock and the Noise Shock
As shown in Hansen and Sargent (2007), we can robustify the permanent income model by as-
suming agents with finite capacity distrust their model of the data-generating process (i.e., their
income process), but still use an ordinary Kalman filter to estimate the true state. Note that with-
out the concern for model misspecification, the consumer has no doubts about the probability
model used to form the conditional expectation of permanent income (s). It is clear that the
Kalman filter under RI, (18), is not only affected by the fundamental shock (ζt+1), but also af-
fected by the endogenous noise (ξt+1) induced by finite capacity; these noise shocks could be
another source of the demand for robustness. We therefore need to consider this demand for ro-
bustness in the RB-RI model. By adding the additional concern for robustness developed here,
we are able to strengthen the effects of robustness on decisions.16 Specifically, we assume that the
agent thinks that (18) is the approximating model.
A simple version of robust optimal control considers the question of how to make decisions
when the agent does not know the probability model that generates the data. Specifically, an
agent with a preference for robustness considers a range of models surrounding the given ap-
proximating model, (18):
ŝt+1 = Rŝt − ct +ωηwt + ηt+1. (21)
15In order that the variance of η be finite we need κ > ln (R) ≈ R− 1. For short time periods this requirement is
obviously not very restrictive. Since R > 1, some minimum level of capacity is needed to control the conditional mean
of permanent income.
16Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) use this approach to study the joint dynamics of consumption, income, and the current
account in emerging and developed countries.
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where wt distorts the mean of the innovation, and makes decisions that maximize lifetime ex-
pected utility given this worst possible model (i.e., the distorted model).17 To make that model
(18) is a good approximation when (21) generates the data, we constrain the approximation errors
by an upper bound ψ0:
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
βt+1w2t
]
≤ ψ0, (22)
where E0 [·] denotes conditional expectations evaluated with model, and the left side of this in-
equality is a statistical measure of the discrepancy between the distorted and approximating mod-
els. Note that the standard full-information RE case corresponds to ψ0 = 0. In the general case in
which ψ0 > 0, the evil agent is given an intertemporal entropy budget η0 > 0 which defines the
set of models that the agent is considering. Following Hansen and Sargent (2007), we compute
robust decision rules by solving the following two-player zero-sum game: a minimizing decision
maker chooses the optimal consumption process {ct} and a maximizing evil agent chooses the
model distortion process {wt}.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2007a), a simple robustness version of the PIH model pro-
posed above can be written as
v (st) = max
ct
min
νt
{
−1
2
(c− ct)2 + β
[
1
2
ϑ0w2t + Et [v (st+1)]
]}
(23)
subject to the distorted transition equation (i.e., the worst-case model), (21), where ϑ0 > 0 is the
Lagrange multiplier on the constraint specified in (22) and controls how bad the error can be.
(23) is a standard dynamic programming problem and can be easily solved using the standard
procedure.18 The following proposition summarizes the solution to the RB-RI model.
Proposition 1. Given ϑ0 and κ, the consumption function under RB and RI is
ct =
R− 1
1−Π ŝt −
Πc
1−Π (24)
with Π < 1, the mean of the worst-case shock is
ωηwt =
(R− 1)Π
1−Π ŝt −
Πc¯
1−Π , (25)
and ŝt is governed by
ŝt+1 = ρs ŝt +
Πc
1−Π + ηt+1, (26)
where ρs = 1−RΠ1−Π ∈ (0, 1),
Π =
Rω2η
ϑ0
∈ (0, 1) , (27)
17Formally, this setup is a game between the decision-maker and a malevolent nature that chooses the distortion
process wt.
18There is a one-to-one correspondence between ψ0 in (22) and ϑ0 in (23).
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ηt+1 is defined in (19),
ω2η =
θ
1− (1− θ) R2ω
2
ζ ,
and θ = 1− 1/ exp(2κ).
Proof. See Online Appendix 8.1. Π < 1 can be obtained because the second-order condition for
the optimization problem is
R (R− 1)
2
(
1− Rω2η/ϑ0
) > 0, i.e., Π < 1.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2007), we can also use multiplier preferences to represent a
fear of model misspecification:
v̂ (ŝt) = max
ct
{
−1
2
(ct − c)2 + βmin
mt+1
Et [mt+1v̂ (ŝt+1) + ϑ0mt+1 ln (mt+1)]
}
, (28)
where mt+1 is the likelihood ratio, Et [mt+1 ln (mt+1)] is defined as the relative entropy of the
distribution of the distorted model with respect to that of the approximating model, and ϑ0 > 0
is the shadow price of capacity that can reduce the distance between the two distributions, i.e.,
the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint:
Et [mt+1 ln (mt+1)] ≤ η,
where η ≥ 0 defines an entropy ball of the distribution of the distorted model with respect to that
of the approximating model. Minimizing with respect to mt+1 yields
mt+1 =
exp (−v (ŝt+1) /ϑ0)
Et [exp (−v (ŝt+1) /ϑ0)] , (29)
and it is straightforward to show that substituting mt+1 into (28) yields the following Bellman
equation:
v̂ (ŝt) = max
ct
{
−1
2
(ct − c)2 + βRt [v̂ (ŝt+1)]
}
, (30)
where
Rt [v̂ (ŝt+1)] = −ϑ0 log Et [exp (−v̂ (ŝt+1) /ϑ0)] ,
subject to (18). The following proposition summarizes the solution to the RB-RI model when
βR = 1.
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Proposition 2. Given ϑ0 and θ, the consumption function under RB and RI is
ct =
R− 1
1−Π ŝt −
Πc
1−Π , (31)
the value function is
v̂ (ŝt) = Ω
(
ŝt − cR− 1
)2
+ ρ, (32)
where Ω = −R(R−1)2(1−Π) , ρ = ϑ02(R−1) ln
(
1− (R−1)Π1−Π
)
, and ŝt is governed by (26).
Proof. See Online Appendix 8.2.
Comparing (24) with (31), it is clear that the two specifications of RB, the two-player minmax
game and multiplier preferences, lead to the same consumption-saving decisions.19 Equations
(31) and (27) determine the effects of model uncertainty due to RB and state uncertainty due to
RI on the marginal propensity to consume out of perceived permanent income (MPCη) and the
constant precautionary saving premium. It is clear from these two expressions that Π governs
how RB and RI interact and then affect the consumption function and precautionary savings.
Since Π is increasing with the degrees of both RB (smaller ϑ0) and RI (smaller κ and θ), it is
straightforward to show that either RB or RI leads to more constant precautionary savings and
higher marginal propensity to consume, holding other factors constant and given that Π < 1.
However, RB and RI affect consumption and precautionary savings through distinct channels.
RI affects Π by increasing the variance of the innovation to the perceived state, ω2η , whereas RB
affects Π via changing the structure of the response of consumption to income shocks. Further-
more, if we consider the marginal propensity to consume out of true permanent income,
MPCζ ≡ R− 11− Rθ/ [ϑ0 (1− (1− θ) R2)]ω2ζ
θ, (33)
we can immediately see that
∂
(
MPCζ
)
∂ϑ0
< 0,
∂
(
MPCζ
)
∂θ
> 0.
That is, both an increase in the demand for robustness and an increase in inattention reduces the
marginal propensity to consume out of true (but unobserved) permanent income.
To examine the relative importance of the two informational frictions in determining the con-
sumption function and precautionary savings, we compare the effects from proportionate shifts
in ϑ0 governing RB and κ governing RI. Specifically, the marginal effects on Π from an increase in
19In Section (5), we show that the two specifications have slightly different asset pricing implications.
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ϑ0 and κ are given by
∂Π
∂κ
=
R
(
1− R2) exp (−2κ)
ϑ0 [1− exp (−2κ) R2]2
ω2ζ ,
∂Π
∂ϑ0
= −Rω
2
η
ϑ20
,
respectively. Therefore, the marginal rate of transformation between proportionate changes in ϑ
and changes in κ can be written as
MRT = − ∂Π/∂κ
(∂Π/∂ϑ0) ϑ0
=
2
(
R2 − 1) exp (−2κ)
(1− exp (−2κ)) (1− exp (−2κ) R2) > 0. (34)
This expression gives the proportionate reduction in ϑ0 (i.e., a stronger preference for RB) that
compensates, at the margin, for a decrease in κ (i.e., more inattentive) — in the sense of preserv-
ing the same effect on the consumption function for a given ŝt. Equation (34) shows that this
compensating change depends on the interest rate (R) and the degree of inattention (κ). Figure 2
clearly shows that MRT is decreasing with κ for any given R. Since ∂ (MRT) /∂κ < 0, consumers
with lower capacity will ask for higher compensation in an proportionate increase in model un-
certainty facing them for an increase in capacity. For example, when R = 1.03, MRT = 0.256
when κ = 0.5 bits, while MRT = 0.054 when κ = 1 bit. In other words, to maintain the same
effect on the consumption function, a decrease in κ by 50 percent (from 1 bit to 0.5 bits) matches
up approximately with a proportional decline in ϑ0 of 2.7 percent. We will show later that there
is a model-independent procedure for estimating ϑ; the tradeoff here could in principle be used
to discipline the choice for κ.20
It is also instructive to examine exactly what agents "fear" – that is, what are the dynamics of
permanent income under the worst-case model? Substituting (25) and (19) into the law of motion
for ŝt under the worst-case model yields
ŝt+1 = (1− θR) ŝt + θRst + θ (ζt+1 + ξt+1) , (35)
as compared to the actual process
ŝt+1 =
(
1− R2ω2η/ϑ0
1− Rω2η/ϑ0
− θR
)
ŝt +
(
Rω2η/ϑ0
)
c
1− Rω2η/ϑ0
+ θRst + θ (ζt+1 + ξt+1) . (36)
The key difference between the two processes is the autocorrelation parameter; since
1− R2ω2η/ϑ0
1− Rω2η/ϑ0
< 1,
20κ (or θ) are difficult to estimate outside the model; the literature on processing information provides estimates of
the total ability of humans, but little guidance on how much of that ability would be dedicated to monitoring economic
data. Obviously it would not be feasible to model all the competing demands for attention.
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the worst case model is more persistent than the true process. As noted in Kasa (2006), the most
destructive distortions are low-frequency ones, so naturally the agents in the model design their
decision rules to be robust against precisely those kinds of processes. ϑ0 does not appear in (35),
as it only determines the size of the distortion process {wt} needed to achieve the worst-case
model.21
2.3. Robust Kalman Filter Gain
Another source of robustness could arise from the Kalman filter gain. In Section 2.2, we assumed
that the agent distrusts the innovation to the perceived state but trusts the regular Kalman filter
gain. Following Hansen and Sargent (Chapter 17, 2007), in this section we consider a situation in
which the agent pursues a robust Kalman gain. Specifically, assume that at t the agent observes
the noisy signal
s∗t = st + ξt, (37)
where st is the true state and ξt is the iid endogenous noise. The variance of the noise term,
λ2 = var (ξt), is determined by
λ2 = var (ξt) =
(
ω2ζ + R
2σ2
)
σ2
ω2ζ + (R
2 − 1) σ2 ,
and σ2 =
ω2ζ
exp(2κ)−R2 is the steady state conditional variance. Given the budget constraint,
st+1 = Rst − ct + ζt+1, (38)
we consider the following time-invariant robust Kalman filter equation,
ŝt+1 = (1− θ) (Rŝt − ct) + θ (st+1 + ξt+1) , (39)
where ŝt+1 is the estimate of the state using the history of the noisy signals,
{
s∗j
}t+1
j=0
. We want θ to
be robust to unstructured misspecifications of Equations (37) and (38). To obtain a robust Kalman
filter gain, the agent considers the following distorted model:
st+1 = Rst − ct + ζt+1 +ων1,t+1, (40)
s∗t+1 = st+1 + ξt+1 + $ν2,t+1, (41)
where ν1,t+1 and ν2,t+1 are distortions to the conditional means of the two shocks, ζt+1 and ξt+1,
respectively.
Combining (38), (39), (40) with (41) gives the following dynamic equation for the estimation
21If θ = 1 (so that ŝt = st) then the worst-case model is a random walk.
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error:
et+1 = (1− θ) Ret + (1− θ) ζt+1 − θξt+1 + (1− θ)ων1,t+1 − θ$ν2,t+1, (42)
where et = st − ŝt.22 We can then solve for the robust Kalman filter gain corresponding to this
problem by solving the following deterministic optimal linear regulator problem:
eT0 Pe0 = max{νt+1}
∞
∑
t=0
(
eTt et − ϑνTt+1νt+1
)
, (43)
subject to
et+1 = (1− θ) Ret + Dνt+1, (44)
where D =
[
(1− θ)ω −θ$
]
and νt+1 =
[
ν1,t+1 ν2,t+1
]T
. We can compute the worst-case
shock by solving the corresponding Bellman equation
ν∗t+1 = Qet, (45)
where
Q =
(
ϑI − DTPD
)−1
DTP (1− θ) R. (46)
Here I is the identity matrix, and Q depends on robustness (ϑ) and channel capacity (κ).
For arbitrary Kalman filter gain θ and (45), the error in reconstructing the state s can be written
as
et+1 = {(1− θ) R + [(1− θ)ω− θ$]Q} et + (1− θ) ζt+1 − θξt+1. (47)
Taking unconditional mean on both sides of (47) gives
Σt+1 = {(1− θ) R + [(1− θ)ω− θ$]Q}Σt + (1− θ)2 ω2ζ + θ2ω2ξ , (48)
where Σt+1 = E
[
e2t+1
]
. From (48), it follows directly that in the steady state
Σ (θ; Q) =
(1− θ)2 ω2ζ + θ2ω2ξ
1− χ2 ,
where χ = (1− θ) R + [(1− θ)ω− θ$]Q, and the robust Kalman filter gain θ (ϑ, κ) minimizes
the variance of et, Σ (θ; Q):
θ (ϑ, κ) = arg min (Σ (θ; Q (ϑ, κ))) . (49)
Figure 3 illustrates how robustness (measured by ϑ) and inattention (measured by κ) affect the
robust Kalman gain when R = 1.02 and ωζ = 1.23 It clearly shows that holding the degree of
attention (i.e., channel capacity κ) fixed, increasing robustness (reducing ϑ) increases the Kalman
gain (θ). In addition, for given robustness (ϑ), the Kalman gain is increasing with capacity. For
22Note that control variable, c, does not affect the estimation error equation.
23We use the program rfilter.m provided in Hansen and Sargent (2007) to compute the robust Kalman filter gain
θ (ϑ, κ).
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example, when log (ϑ) = 3, the robust Kalman gain will increase from 60.17 percent to 77.35
percent when capacity κ increases from 0.6 bits to 1 bit; when κ = 0.6 bits, the robust Kalman gain
will increase from 58.31 percent to 60.17 percent if ϑ falls from log (ϑ) = 4 to 3.24
After obtaining the robust Kalman gain θ (ϑ, κ), we can solve the Bellman equation proposed
in Section 2.2 using the Kalman filtering equation with robust θ. The following proposition sum-
marizes the solution to this problem:
Proposition 3. Given ϑ0, ϑ, and κ, the consumption function is
ct =
R− 1
1−Π ŝt −
Πc
1−Π , (50)
where
Π =
Rω2η
ϑ0
∈ (0, 1) , (51)
ω2η = var [ηt+1] =
θ (ϑ, κ)
1− (1− θ (ϑ, κ)) R2ω
2
ζ ,
and ŝt is governed by
ŝt+1 = ρs ŝt + ηt+1, (52)
where ρs = 1−RΠ1−Π ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The proof is the similar to that provided in Online Appendix 8.2. We just need to replace
θ (κ) = 1− exp (−2κ) with θ (ϑ, κ).
Note that here θ is a function of both ϑ (concerns about Kalman gain) and κ (channel capac-
ity), rather than simply 1− 1/ exp (2κ) as obtained in Section 2.2. In this case the agent has two
types of concerns about model misspecification: (i) concerns about the disturbances to the per-
ceived permanent income (ϑ0) and (ii) concerns about the Kalman gain (ϑ). It is clear from (50)
and (51) that the two types of robustness have opposing effects on both the marginal propen-
sity to consume out of permanent income, i.e., the responsiveness of ct to ŝt
(
MPCη = R−11−Π
)
and
precautionary savings, i.e., the intercept of the consumption profile
(
PS = Πc1−Π = −c + c1−Π
)
.25
Specifically, the less the value of ϑ0 (Type I robustness) the larger the MPC and the larger the
precautionary saving increment, since
∂
(
MPCη
)
∂ϑ0
< 0 and
∂ (PS)
∂ϑ0
< 0.
For the effects of Type II robustness (ϑ), the less the value of ϑ the less the MPC and the less the
24This result is consistent with that obtained in a continuous-time setting discussed in Kasa (2006).
25Note that given the consumption function Π has the same effect on the marginal propensity to consume and
precautionary savings.
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precautionary saving increment
∂
(
MPCη
)
∂ϑ
> 0 and
∂ (PS)
∂ϑ
> 0
because
∂ω2η
∂θ < 0 and
∂θ
∂ϑ < 0.
From (50) and (51), it is clear that the precautionary savings increment in the RB-RI model is
determined by the interaction of three factors: labor income uncertainty, preferences for robust-
ness (RB), and finite information-processing capacity (RI). We first present some intuition about
the effects of Type I robustness (ϑ0) on precautionary savings. Since agents with low capacity are
very concerned about the confluence of low permanent income and high consumption (meaning
they believe their permanent income is high so they consume a lot and then their new signal indi-
cates that in fact their permanent income was low), they take actions which reduce the probability
of this bad event – they save more. The strength of the precautionary effect is positively related
to the amount of uncertainty regarding the true level of permanent income, and this uncertainty
increases as θ gets smaller.
We now provide some intuition about the effects of Type II robustness (ϑ) on precautionary
savings. An increase in Type II robustness (a reduction in ϑ) will increase the Kalman gain θ,
which leads to lower ω2η and then low precautionary savings. Figure 4 illustrates how Type II
robustness (ϑ) and channel capacity (κ) affect ω2η . In addition, since
∂ω2η
∂ϑ
> 0,
∂ω2η
∂κ
< 0,
∂ω2η
∂ϑ0
= 0.
it is clear that under certain conditions a greater reaction to the shock can either be interpreted as
an increased concern for robustness in the presence of model misspecification, or an increase in
information-processing ability when agents only have finite channel capacity. Figure 5 illustrates
Π as functions of ϑ0 and ϑ. It clearly shows that how increasing the robustness preference for the
shock to the perceived state (decreasing ϑ0) and reducing the preference for a robust gain (increas-
ing ϑ) increases Π and then increase the effects of the two types of robustness on consumption
and precautionary savings.
3. Consumption and Saving Dynamics
3.1. Sensitivity and Smoothness of Consumption Process
We will now discuss the effect of RI-RB on the dynamics of consumption, in particular the excess
smoothness and sensitivity puzzles noted earlier. Since the deterministic growth component
does not affect the stochastic properties of the model, for simplicity, here we assume that there
is no growth component (g = 1). Combining (50) with (52) yields the change in individual con-
16
sumption in the RI-RB economy:
ct = ρsct−1 +
(R− 1)Π
1−Π c +
R− 1
1−Π
[
θζt
1− (1− θ)R · L + θ
(
ξt − θRξt−11− (1− θ)R · L
)]
, (53)
where L is the lag operator and we assume that (1− θ)R < 1. This expression shows that con-
sumption growth is a weighted average of all past permanent income and noise shocks. In ad-
dition, it is also clear from (53) that the propagation mechanism of the model is determined by
the robust Kalman filter gain, θ (ϑ, κ). Figure 6 illustrates that consumption in the RB-RI model
reacts gradually to income shocks, with monotone adjustments to the corresponding RB asymp-
tote. Note that when ϑ0 = 2 and log (ϑ) = 3, the robust Kalman gain is θ = 42.56 percent. This
case is illustrated by the dash-dotted line in Figure 4. Similarly, the dotted line corresponds to the
case in which ϑ0 = 4 and log (ϑ) = 5 (θ = 0.3541). With a stronger preference for robustness, the
precautionary savings increment is larger and thus an income shock that is initially undetected
would have larger impacts on consumption during the adjustment process.
Using (53), we can obtain the expression for the relative volatility of consumption growth
relative to income growth. The following proposition provides the expression of this relative
volatility.
Proposition 4. The relative volatility of consumption growth relative to income growth is
µ ≡ sd (∆ct)
sd (∆yt)
=
θ
1−Π
√√√√ ∞∑
j=0
Υ2j +
1− θ
θ (1− (1− θ) R2)
∞
∑
j=0
(
Υj − RΥj−1
)2, (54)
where we use the fact that ω2ξ = var (ξt) =
1−θ
θ(1−(1−θ)R2)ω
2
ζ , ρs =
1−RΠ
1−Π ∈ (0, 1), ρθ = (1− θ) R ∈
(0, 1), and
Υj =
j
∑
k=0
(
ρ
j−k
s ρ
k
θ
)
−
j−1
∑
k=0
(
ρ
j−1−k
s ρ
k
θ
)
, for j ≥ 1,
and Υ0 = 1.
Proof. See Online Appendix 8.3.
Figure (7) illustrates how the combination of the two types of robustness, ϑ0 and ϑ, affects the
relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth when κ = 0.3 bits. It clearly shows
that given ϑ0, the relative volatility µ is increasing with ϑ. The intuition is that reducing ϑ (i.e.,
increasing Type II robustness) increases the robust Kalman gain θ and reduces ω2η and Π, which
leads to a smoother consumption process. Note that θ is independent of ϑ0. Hence, given ϑ, µ is
decreasing with ϑ0 becauseΠ is increasing with ϑ0. To explore the intuition behind this result, we
consider the perfect-state-observation case in which κ = ∞. In this case, the relative volatility of
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consumption growth to income growth reduces to
µ =
1
1−Π
√
2
1+ ρs
, (55)
which clearly shows that ϑ0 increases the relative volatility via two channels. First, a higher ϑ0
increases the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income
( R−1
1−Π
)
, and second, it
increases consumption volatility by reducing the persistence of permanent income measured by
ρs:
∂ρs
∂Π < 0.
In the presence of robustness, rational inattention measured by κ affects consumption volatil-
ity via two channels: (i) the gradual and smooth responses to income shocks (i.e., the 1− ρθ · L
term in (53) and (ii) the RI-induced noises (ξt). Specifically, a reduction in capacity κ decreases the
Kalman gain θ, which strengthens the smooth responses to income shock and increases the volatil-
ity of the RI-induced noise. Luo (2008) shows that the noise effect dominates the smooth response
effect, and the volatility of consumption growth decreases with κ. Figure 8 illustrates how the
combination of ϑ0 and ϑ affects the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth
when κ = 0.3 bits and there is no noise term. In this case, ∆ct =
(1−R)Π
1−Π (ct−1 − c) + R−11−Π θζt1−ρθ ·L .
Figure 8 shows that given ϑ0, the relative volatility µ is decreasing with ϑ. The intuition is that
reducing ϑ (i.e., increasing Type I robustness) increases the robust Kalman gain θ, which leads to
a more volatile consumption process because the smooth response effect completely dominates
the noise effect.
3.2. Saving Process
Combining the original budget constraint, bt+1 = Rbt + yt − ct, with the consumption function
(50), we can obtain the following expression for individual saving dt:
dt ≡ bt+1 − bt
=
−Π (R− 1)
1−Π
(
bt − b
)
+
(
1− R− 1
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
)
(yt − y) + ςt+1, (56)
where the evolution of individual financial wealth (bt) follows
bt+1 = ρsbt +
Π
1−Π (c− y) +
(
1− R− 1
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
)
(yt − y) + ςt+1, (57)
where ςt+1 = R−11−Π (st − ŝt) is determined by the estimation error, st − ŝt = (1−θ)ζt1−(1−θ)R·L − θξt1−(1−θ)R·L
and b = c−yR−1 is the steady state value of bt. From (56), it is straightforward to show that the both
the unconditional and conditional means of individual saving are zero:
E [dt] = 0 or Et [dt] = 0.
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That is, induced uncertainty due to the interaction of RB and RI does not affect the amount of in-
dividual saving on average. Using (56), we can compute the cross-sectional variance of individual
savings. The following proposition provides the expression of this variance.
Proposition 5. The variance of individual savings is
var (dt) =
 1−ρ1+ρ + Γ21−ρ2s + ( R−11−Π)2 1−θ1−R2(1−θ)
+ 2(1−ρ)Γ1−ρρs +
( R−1
1−Π
) 2(1−ρ)(1−θ)
1−ρρθ +
( R−1
1−Π
) 2Γ(1−θ)
1−ρsρθ
ω2ζ , (58)
where Γ = − (R−1)Π1−Π < 0, ρs = 1−RΠ1−Π , and Π = θ(ϑ,κ)1−(1−θ(ϑ,κ))R2 Rω2ζ/ϑ0.
Proof. See Online Appendix 8.5.
The complexity of this expression prevents us from obtaining clear results about how RI and
RB affect the variance of individual savings. Figure 9 illustrates the effects of RI (κ) and RB
(ϑ0, ϑ) on the relative volatility of dt to ω2ζ , µd ≡
√
var (dt) /ω2ζ when ω
2
ζ = 1 and ρ = 0.9. It is
clear from the figure that for a given ϑ0 (Type I robustness), this relative volatility is decreasing
with the degree of attention (θ) that is determined by ϑ and κ. In other words, µd is decreasing
with channel capacity (κ) and is increasing with Type II robustness (ϑ) because ∂θ(ϑ,κ)∂κ > 0 and
∂θ(ϑ,κ)
∂ϑ < 0.
If we now consider an aggregate economy with a continuum of ex ante identical inattentive
consumers with the same preference for robustness and each of them has the consumption func-
tion (50), then the total saving demand in the economy is equal to zero. The intuition is simple.
The saving function can be expressed as a combination of different types of income and noise
shocks: ς, ε or ζ, and ξ, and all of these shocks are idiosyncratic. These idiosyncratic shocks can-
cel out after aggregating across consumers and therefore have no effect on aggregate savings. In
Section 6 we study an economy with mortality that generates positive aggregate savings.
4. Comparison with Risk-sensitive Control and Filtering
Risk-sensitivity (RS) was first introduced into the LQ-Gaussian framework by Jacobson (1973) and
extended by Whittle (1981, 1990). Exploiting the recursive utility framework of Epstein and Zin
(1989), Hansen and Sargent (1995) introduce discounting into the RS specification and show that
the resulting decision rules are time-invariant. In the RS model agents effectively compute expec-
tations through a distorted lens, increasing their effective risk aversion by overweighting negative
outcomes. The resulting decision rules depend explicitly on the variance of the shocks, producing
precautionary savings, but the value functions are still quadratic functions of the states.26 Hansen,
Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) and Hansen and Sargent (2007) interpret RS preferences in terms of a
concern about model uncertainty (robustness or RB) and argue that RS introduces precautionary
26Formally, one can view risk-sensitive agents as ones who have non-state-separable preferences, as in Epstein and
Zin (1989), but with a value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to one.
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savings because RS consumers want to protect themselves against model specification errors. In
the corresponding risk-sensitive filtering LQ problem, the problem is that when the state cannot
be observed perfectly, is the classical Kalman filter that minimizes the expected loss function still
optimal? In our LQ-PIH model setting, we can easily see that the regular Kalman filter is still
optimal given the quadratic forms of the utility function and the value function.27
In this section we will explore how the RS filtering affects consumption dynamics and pre-
cautionary savings and show that the OE between RB and RS is no longer linear, but takes a
more complicated non-linear form. The RI version of risk-sensitive control based on recursive
preferences with an exponential certainty equivalence function can be formulated as follows:
v̂ (ŝt) = max
ct
{
−1
2
(ct − c)2 + βRt [v̂ (ŝt+1)]
}
(59)
subject to the Kalman filter equation (18).28 The distorted expectation operator is now given by
Rt [v̂ (ŝt+1)] = −1
α
log Et [exp (−αv̂ (ŝt+1))] ,
where s0| I0 ∼ N
(
ŝ0, σ2
)
, ŝt = Et [st] is the perceived state variable, θ is the optimal weight on the
new observation of the state, and ξt+1 is the endogenous noise. The optimal choice of the weight θ
is given by θ (κ) = 1− 1/ exp(2κ) ∈ [0, 1]. It is worth noting that given that the value function in
the RS model is quadratic, the regular Kalman filter is still optimal because the objective function
in the filtering problem is the square of the estimation error.
Following the same procedure used in Hansen and Sargent (1995) and Luo and Young (2010),
we can solve this risk-sensitive control problem explicitly. The following proposition summarizes
the solution to the RI-RS model when βR = 1:
Proposition 6. Given finite channel capacity κ and the degree of risk-sensitivity α, the consumption
function of a risk-sensitive consumer under RI is
ct =
R− 1
1−Π ŝt −
Πc
1−Π , (60)
27As has been shown in Moore, Elliott, and Dey (1997), even if the agent has the risk-sensitive preference when
filtering,
min ln Et
{
exp
[
−ϑ
(
st − ŝRSt
)2]}
,
the risk-senstive estimate ŝRSt is identical to the minimum variance estimate ŝ obtained from solving
min Et
[
(st − ŝt)2
]
.
28Given the quadratic form of the value function, introducing risk-sensitivity does not change the optimality of the
ex post Gaussianity of the true state and the induced noise; see Luo and Young (2010) for more discussion.
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where
Π = Rαω2η ∈ (0, 1) , (61)
ω2η = var (ηt+1) =
θ
1− (1− θ) R2ω
2
ζ , (62)
ηt+1 is defined in (19), and θ (κ) = 1− 1/ exp(2κ).
Proof. See Online Appendix 8.3.
Comparing (31) obtained from the model with only concerns about the innovation to the per-
ceived state (i.e., without robust Kalman filtering) in Section 2.2 and (60), it is straightforward to
show that RB and RS under RI are indistinguishable using only consumption-savings decisions if
α =
1
ϑ0
. (63)
Note that (63) is exactly the same as the observational equivalence condition obtained in the full-
information RE model (see Backus, Routledge, and Zin 2004). That is, under the assumption that
the agent trusts the Kalman filter equation, the OE result obtained under full-information RE still
holds under RI.
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) show that as far as the quantity observations on con-
sumption and savings are concerned, the robustness version (ϑ0 > 0 or α > 0, β˜) of the PIH
model is observationally equivalent to the standard version (ϑ0 = ∞ or α = 0, β = 1/R) of the
PIH model for a unique pair of discount factors.29 The intuition is that introducing a preference
for risk-sensitivity (RS) or a concern about robustness (RB) increases savings in the same way
as increasing the discount factor, so that the discount factor can be changed to offset the effect
of a change in RS or RB on consumption and investment.30 Alternatively, holding all parame-
ters constant except the pair (α, β), the RI version of the PIH model with RB consumers (ϑ0 > 0
and βR = 1) is observationally equivalent to the standard RI version of the model (ϑ0 = ∞ and
β˜ > 1/R). To do so, we compare the consumption function obtained from the RI model (ϑ0 = ∞
and β˜ > 1/R),
ct =
(
R− 1
βR
)
ŝt − 1R− 1
(
1− 1
βR
)
c.
with (31)and (60), and obtain the following OE expression for the discount factor:
Proposition 7. Let
β˜ =
1
R
1− Rω2η/ϑ0
1− R2ω2η/ϑ0
=
1
R
1− Rαω2η
1− R2αω2η
>
1
R
.
29Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) derive the observational equivalence result by fixing all parameters, includ-
ing R, except for the pair (α, β).
30As shown in Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), the two models have different implications for asset prices
because continuation valuations change as one varies (α, β) within the observationally-equivalent set of parameters.
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Then consumption and savings are identical in the RI, RB-RI, and RS-RI models.
However, if we compare (50) obtained from the model with both concerns about the inno-
vation to the perceived state and concerns about Kalman gain with (60), it is obvious that the
observational equivalence between RB and RS under RI, (63), no longer holds. Given the same
value of κ, the Kalman gain only depends on κ in the RS model, whereas it depends on both
κ and ϑ (the preference for robust Kalman gain) in the RB model. The two Kalman gains are
therefore different for any finite value of ϑ. If we allow for different values of κ, the models are
observationally equivalent when α = ϑ−10 and
θ (ϑ, κRB) = 1− 1exp(2κRS) .
Figure (10) illustrates how κRS varies with ϑ and κRB when the OE between RB and RS holds
under RI. It clearly shows that given the level of ϑ, κRS is increasing with κRB.
5. Market Price of Induced Uncertainty
The PIH model presented in Section 2.2 is usually regarded as a partial equilibrium model. How-
ever, as noted in Hansen (1987) and Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), it can be interpreted
as a general equilibrium model with a linear production technology and an exogenous income
process. Given the expression of optimal consumption in terms of the state variables derived
from the robust version of the PIH model with inattentive agents, we can price assets by treating
the process of aggregate consumption that solves the model as though it were an endowment
process. In this setup, equilibrium prices are shadow prices that leave the agent content with
that endowment process. Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) study how robustness and risk-
sensitivity affect the predicted market price of risk within a PIH model with shocks to both labor
income and preferences, and find that RB or RS significantly alter the model’s predictions on the
market price of risk and thus provides an alternative explanation for the equity premium puzzle.
In this section, using the optimal consumption and saving decisions derived in the previous
sections, we will explore how induced uncertainty due to the interactions of RB and RI with
income shocks affect the market price of uncertainty. We first consider the single-period asset
pricing case. In this case, we assume that the agent purchases a security at period t at a price qt,
holds it for one period, and then sells it at t+ 1 for a total payoff φt+1 in terms of the consumption
good after collecting the dividend. Under this assumption, the following Euler equation holds:
qt = E˜t
[(
β
u′ (ŝt+1)
u′ (ŝt)
)
φt+1
]
, (64)
where β u
′(ŝt+1)
u′(ŝt) is the stochastic discount factor (SDF) and E˜t [·] is the distorted conditional expecta-
tions operator. Note that here SDF depends on the perceived states because optimal consumption
is a linear function of perceived permanent income; because ŝt+1 is a function of the true state st+1,
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st will also affect the SDF. The corresponding formula for qt in terms of the original conditional
expectations operator can be written as
qt = Et [mt,t+1φt+1] , (65)
where mt,t+1 depends not only on the usual SDF but also on robustness. As has been shown in
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), RB or RS are reflected in the usual measure of the SDF being
scaled by a random variable with conditional mean 1. They also show that this multiplicative
adjustment to the SDF increases the volatility of the SDF and thus drives up the risk premium. To
explore the effects of induced uncertainty on the market price of uncertainty, we write (65) as
qt = Et [φt+1] Et [mt,t+1] + cov t (mt,t+1, φt+1) ,
which leads to the following price bound:
qt ≥ Et [φt+1] Et [mt,t+1]− sd t (mt,t+1) sd t (φt+1) ,
where sd t (·) denotes the conditional standard deviation. If we define the market price of uncer-
tainty (MPU) as MPU ≡ sd t(mt,t+1)Et[mt,t+1] , the pricing bound can be rewritten as
MPU ≥ Et [φt+1/qt]
sd t (φt+1/qt)
,
where the RHS is the Sharpe ratio and is above 0.2 for most industrial countries.31 In the stan-
dard full-information state- and time-separable utility model, the value of MPU is an order of
magnitude lower than what is required for this inequality to be satisfied, which is just another
manifestation of the equity premium puzzle: consumption growth is smooth, uncorrelated with
returns, and positively autocorrelated, leading to a small cost of bearing uncertainty.32
5.1. MPU under RB and RI
The SDF, mt,t+1, can be decomposed into
mt,t+1 = m
f
t,t+1m
rb
t,t+1,
where m ft,t+1 ≡ β u
′(ŝt+1)
u′(ŝt) is the “familiar” stochastic discount factor (ϑ0 = ∞) and m
rb
t,t+1 is the
Radon-Nikodym derivative, or the likelihood ratio of the distorted conditional probability of ŝt+1
with respect to the approximating conditional probability. Under the two-player game specifica-
tion of RB, (23), asset prices are computed using the pessimistic view of the next period’s shock:
η˜t+1 = ωη e˜t+1 = ωη (et+1 + wt), where et+1 is a normally distributed variable with mean ωηwt
31In the U.S. data documented in Campbell (2002), the Sharpe ratio is about 0.52 (annualized) during 1947− 1998.
Using a longer annual U.S. time series put together by Shiller yields a similar value of the Sharpe ratio.
32The standard deviation of aggregate consumption growth is 0.84 percent, the autocorrelation is 0.08, and the
correlation with real returns on the S&P500 Index is 0.22.
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and variance ω2η . In this case, the Radon-Nikodym derivative can be written as
mrbt,t+1 ≡
exp
(
− (e˜t+1 − wt)2 /2
)
exp
(−e˜2t+1/2) = exp
(
e˜t+1wt − w2t /2
)
.
By construction, we obtain Et
[
mrbt,t+1
]
= 1. By straightforward calculations, we obtain the fol-
lowing conditional second moment of mrbt,t+1 as a means for computing its conditional variance:
Et
[(
mrbt,t+1
)2]
= exp
(
w2t
)
. (66)
The following proposition summarizes the result on how induced uncertainty affects the market
price of uncertainty.
Proposition 8. The expression for the market price of induced uncertainty is
sd t
(
mrbt,t+1
)
=
√
exp
(
w2t
)− 1 ∼= |wt| (67)
for small distortions, where wt is the mean of the worse-case shock:
wt = Θ [(R− 1) ŝt − c] (68)
and Θ = Π/ωη1−Π .
Proof. Given Et
[
mrbt,t+1
]
= 1, we can obtain (67) using (66). It is also straightfoward to derive (68)
using (25).
Expression (67) clearly shows that the amount of market price of uncertainty contributed by
the Radon-Nikodym derivative is approximately equal to the norm of the mean of the worse-case
shock (w).33 Note that Θ can be used to measure the importance of RB and RI in determining the
market price of uncertainty for given ŝt and ∂Θ/∂Π > 0. Specifically, both ϑ0, ϑ, and κ influence
mrbt,t+1 through their effects on Π.
34 Lowering ϑ0 strengthens the preference for robustness and
then drive mrbt,t+1 away from 1 by increasing Π. Lowering κ reduces the Kalman gain, and then
increases ωη and Π. However, since the evolution of ŝt is also affected by ωη and Π, we have to
take both the Θ term and the (R− 1) ŝt − c term in (68) into account when evaluating how the
interaction of RB and RI affects the market price of uncertainty.
To fully explore how induced uncertainty due to RB and RI affects the market price of un-
certainty, we adopt the calibration procedure outlined in Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002), An-
derson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003), and Hansen and Sargent (Chapter 9, 2007) to calibrate the
33In other words, |wt| is an upper bound on the approximate enhancement to the market price of uncertainty caused
by the interaction of RB and RI.
34When κ = ∞, i.e., no RI, (68) reduces to wt =
Π/ωη
1−Π [(R− 1) st − c]. Without RB, wt = 0.
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value of Π that summarizes the interaction between RB and RI. Specifically, we calibrate Π by
using the notion of a model detection error probability that is based on a statistical theory of
model selection. We can then infer what values of the RB parameter imply reasonable fears of
model misspecification for empirically-plausible approximating models. The model detection er-
ror probability denoted by p is a measure of how far the distorted model can deviate from the
approximating model without being discarded; low values for this probability mean that agents
are unwilling to discard very many models, implying that the cloud of models surrounding the
approximating model is large (since agents want errors to be rare, they push the two models very
far apart). The value of p is determined by the following procedure. Let model A denote the
approximating model, (18), and model B be the distorted model, (21). Define pA as
pA = Prob
(
ln
(
LA
LB
)
< 0
∣∣∣∣ A) , (69)
where ln
(
LA
LB
)
is the log-likelihood ratio. When model A generates the data, pA measures the
probability that a likelihood ratio test selects model B. In this case, we call pA the probability of
the model detection error. Similarly, when model B generates the data, we can define pB as
pB = Prob
(
log
(
LA
LB
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣ B) . (70)
The detection error probability, p, is defined as the average of pA and pB:
p (ϑ0;Π) =
1
2
(pA + pB) , (71)
where ϑ0 is the robustness parameter used to generate model B. Given this definition, we can
see that 1− p measures the probability that econometricians can distinguish the approximating
model from the distorted model. Now we show how to compute the model detection error prob-
ability in the RB model. The general idea of the calibration exercise is to find a value of ϑ0 (or
Π) such that p (ϑ0;Π) equals a given value (for example, 5 percent or 10 percent) after simulating
model A, (18), and model B, (21).35
Following the consumption and saving literature, we set R = 1.02, ω/y0 = 0.15, ρ = 0.8,
and c = 3.5y0. Using these parameter values, Figures 11 and 12 show how p affects the mean
and median of MPU under RB and RI, respectively. It is clear from the figures that the effects of
RB and RI on the mean and median of MPU are quite similar. We therefore focus on the mean
of MPU in our subsequent analysis. Using either the data set documented in Campbell (2002)
or that provided by Shiller, the estimated Sharpe ratio for the postwar U.S. time series is greater
than 50 percent a year. Figure 13 plots the Hansen-Jagannathan (HJ) bound under RB and RI
when θ = 0.1 using the Shiller data set. It is clear from this figure that the model’s predicted MPU
can enter the HJ bound when both the preference for RB and the degree of RI are strong, i.e., when
35The number of periods used in the simulation, T, is set to be the actual length of the data we study. For example,
if we consider the post-war U.S. annual time series data provided by Shiller from 1946− 2010, T = 65.
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p = 0.05 or p = 0.1 and θ = 0.1. If we consider the international developed-country data set in
Campbell (2002), the Sharpe ratio is between 15 percent and 20 percent for Australia and Italy,
between 20 percent and 30 percent for Canada and Japan, and above 30 percent for all the other
countries. In the long-run annual data sets the lower bound on the standard deviation exceeds
30% for all three countries. From Figure 13, we can see that the theoretical MPU satisfies the HJ
bound for higher values of p. Figure (14) clearly shows that our results about how the interaction
of RB and RI with income uncertainty affects the market price of uncertainty are robust to the
changes in the values of R, ω/y0, ρ, and c.
5.2. MPU under RS and RI
Under the risk-sensitivity (RS) specification of RB, (28), we can also compute the corresponding
market price of uncertainty. The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution between t and t + 1
can be written as
mt,t+1 = m
f
t,t+1m
rs
t,t+1,
where m ft,t+1 ≡ β u
′(ŝt+1)
u′(ŝt) and
mrst,t+1 ≡
exp (−vt+1/ϑ0)
Et [exp (−vt+1/ϑ0)] =
exp
(− (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)
exp
(
−
(
Ω̂ŝ2t + ρ̂
)
/ϑ0
) .
Using a formula found in Jacobson (1973) and used in Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), we
have
Et
[(
mrst,t+1
)2]
= exp
(
−2
[(
Ω˜− Ω̂
)
ŝ2t + (ρ˜− ρ̂)
]
/ϑ0
)
,
because Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)] = exp(−2(Ω˜ŝ2t + ρ˜) /ϑ0). The following proposition
summarizes the result on how induced uncertainty affects the amount of market price of uncer-
tainty under the RS specification of RB.
Proposition 9. Under this specification, the Radon-Nikodym derivative is
Et
[(
mrst,t+1
)2]
= exp
(
Ξrs [(R− 1) ŝt − c]2
)
Υ, (72)
where Ξrs ≡ RΠ(1−RΠ)
ϑ0(1−Π)2[1−(2R−1)Π] and Υ ≡
1−(R−1)Π/(1−Π)√
1−2(R−1)Π/(1−Π) . The market price of induced uncertainty
is
sd t
(
mrst,t+1
)
=
√
exp
(
Ξrs ((R− 1) ŝt − c)2
)
Υ− 1 ∼= |
√
Ξrs ((R− 1) ŝt − c) | (73)
Proof. See Online Appendix 8.4.
Denote Ξrb = Θ2, we have
∆ ≡
√
Ξrs
Ξrb
=
√
1− RΠ
1− (2R− 1)Π , (74)
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which is close 1 when R is close 1 and Π is not sufficiently high. Using (74), it is straightforward
to show that
∂∆
∂Π
> 0 and
∂∆
∂θ
< 0,
i.e., the stronger the degree of RI, the larger the difference of the market price of uncertainty under
the RB and RS specifications. Figure 15 illustrates how ∆ varies with Π for given values of R. It is
clear that theoretically the difference of the market price of uncertainty between RB and RS under
RI can be very significant. For example, when R = 1.02, ∆ = 1.25 whenΠ = 0.93. In other words,
the MPU under the RS-RI specification is 25 percent higher than that under the RB-RI specification
when the two models are observationally equivalent. However, after calibrating empirically-
plausible ϑ0 (andΠ) using the DEP, sdt
(
mrbt,t+1
)
and sdt
(
mrst,t+1
)
are very close because R is close
to 1 and the calibrated values of Π are between 0.1 and 0.2 for p = 0.05.36 Figure (16) clearly
shows that the two specifications have similar effects on the mean of for MPU different values of
p and θ. In addition, Figure 17 plots the HJ bound under RS and RI when θ = 0.1 using the same
data set as in the above RB-RI specification, and it is clear that this HJ bound is similar to that
shown in Figure 13.
6. Implications for Aggregate Wealth Accumulation
In this section, following Caballero (1991), Irvine and Wang (1994), and Wang (2000), we consider
an aggregate economy with a continuum of infinitely-lived inattentive agents having the prefer-
ence for robustness. The aggregate economy we consider is an overlapping generations model
with a constant population size (normalized to 1) and mortality risk. The individual consumers
in the aggregate economy are ex ante identical in the sense that they face the same exogenously
given income process, the same initial level of financial wealth, and have the same degrees of
inattention and concerns about model misspecification. Within this setting, we can examine how
two types of induced uncertainty, model uncertainty due to RB and state uncertainty due to RI,
affect aggregate wealth accumulation.
Specifically, we assume that δ is the probability of surviving through period t + 1, given that
one is alive at t. The unconditional probability of reaching age t is δt−1, and the effective discount
factor can be written as β˜ = δβ. Incorporating the survival rate into the above RI-RB model, the
objective function becomes
v(s0) = max{ct}
{
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β˜tu(ct)
]}
.
For simplicity, we also impose the restriction that β˜R = 1. Note that given the survival rate
(δ) and the population size (1) for the aggregate economy in any period, the population size of
individuals who die in any period is 1− δ. Since the population size of the newborn in any period
is also 1− δ, the population size of the aggregate economy remains constant over time.
Using the income process with the growth component (g > 1), (4), the budget constraint, (5),
36The calibrated values of Π are lower for higher values of p.
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and the consumption function, (50), the dynamic equation of financial wealth (bt) can be written
as
bt+1 = ρsbt +
(
1− R− 1
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
)
(yt − yt)+
[
1− (R− 1) (R− g + 1− ρ)
(1−Π) (R− ρ) (R− g)
]
yt +
Πc
1−Π + ςt+1,
(75)
where ςt+1 = R−11−Π (st − ŝt) and yt = E [yt] = g−ρ1−ρ gty0. (See Online Appendix 8.5 for the deriva-
tion.) Writing (75) recursively to yield
bt+1 = ρt+1s b0 +
(
1− R− 1
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
) t
∑
j=0
ρ
t−j
s
(
yj − yj
)
(76)
+
{[
1− (R− 1) (R− g + 1− ρ)
(1−Π) (R− ρ) (R− g)
]
yt +
Πc
1−Π
}
1− ρt+1s
1− ρs +
t+1
∑
j=0
ρ
t+1−j
s ς j
The aggregate economy is populated by a continuum of ex ante identical, but ex post het-
erogeneous consumers because consumers face both idiosyncratic income and noise shocks. Sun
(2006) presents an exact law of large numbers for this type of economic models and then char-
acterizes the cancellation of individual risk via aggregation. In this model, we adopt this law of
large numbers (LLN) and assume that the initial cross-sectional distributions of the income and
noise shocks are their stationary distributions. Provided that we construct the space of agents
and the probability spaces appropriately, all idiosyncratic shocks are canceled out, and aggregate
income is constant and aggregate noise is zero. That is, the cross-sectional mean of ς j for any j
is constant.37 As the population size of the age t group is (1− δ) δt−1, aggregate wealth in the
economy, A, can be written as
A = (1− δ)
∞
∑
t=1
(
δt−1b˜t
)
, (77)
where b˜t = bt − ∑tj=0 ρt−js ς j. At any period, there are 1− δ newborns entering the economy and
demanding a total endowment, (1− δ) b0. At the same time, 1− δ individuals die, leaving a total
accidental bequest (1− δ) A. Following Caballero (1991), the equilibrium condition is that the
total supply of wealth equals the total demand for wealth:
b0 = A. (78)
To determine a steady state equilibrium, we need the following assumption.
Assumption 1 δg < 1 and R > g.
We assume R > g to guarantee that the x component is positively related to permanent income:
s ≡ b + 1R−ρy + 1(R−g)(R−ρ)x. Here we also impose the restriction that δg < 1 so that the turnover
of the population is sufficiently higher than the growth rate of income. Substituting (76) and (78)
into (77), we can solve for A and have the following proposition:
37Wang (2003) applied the same LLN in the Caballero-type model with idiosyncratic income shocks.
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Proposition 10. Given that β˜R = 1, in the steady state equilibrium, aggregate wealth is
A∗ = F (Π)
g (g− ρ) (1− δ) (1− δρs)
(1− ρ) (1− δg) (1− δgρs)y0 +
1
R− 1c, (79)
where F (Π) = 1Π
[
1−Π
R−1 − R−g+1−ρ(R−ρ)(R−g)
]
, ρs = 1−RΠ1−Π , and Π =
θ(ϑ,κ)
1−(1−θ(ϑ,κ))R2 Rω
2
ζ/ (2ϑ0). Therefore,
equilibrium aggregate wealth in this model depends on the interactions of RB and RI with fundamental
income uncertainty. Given that aggregate income (Y) is Y = (1− δ)∑∞t=1
(
δt−1yt
)
= g(1−δ)1−pg y0, the
wealth-income ratio is
A∗
Y
= F (Π)
(g− ρ) (1− δρs)
(1− ρ) (1− δgρs) +
1− δg
g (1− δ) (R− 1)
c
y0
. (80)
Proof. See Online Appendix 8.5.
As we found above, the expressions (79) and (80) do not lend themselves to clear results
regarding how RI and RB affect A∗ or A∗/Y. Figure 18 illustrates the effect of Π on A∗/Y, when
δ = 0.96, R = 1.03, ω2ζ = 1, and ρ = 0.9.
38 It is clear from the figure that for a given g > 1, the
equilibrium aggregate wealth-income ratio is increasing with Π:
∂ (A∗/Y)
∂Π
> 0.
Similarly, we also have ∂A
∗
∂Π > 0. Since Π is a function of ϑ0, ϑ, and κ, equilibrium aggregate
wealth depends on both RB and RI. We now consider the following numerical example to see
how induced uncertainty due to RB and RI affects A∗/Y. When we set g = 1.02, ϑ0 = 1, and
Rω2ζ/ (2ϑ0) = 0.62, A
∗/Y (or A∗) will fall by 85 percent, increase by 3 percent, and fall by 7 percent
as Type I robustness (ϑ0), Type II robustness (ϑ), and capacity κ are increased by 10 percent,
respectively.39 These results clearly show that induced uncertainty due to the interactions of RI,
RB, and fundamental uncertainty does have significant effects on aggregate wealth accumulation
in equilibrium. Furthermore, it is not surprising that Type I robustness has the greatest effect on
aggregate wealth because it enters the Π function directly while Type II robustness and capacity
only affect Π through the robust Kalman gain.
It is worth noting that when there is no income growth component (g = 1), (79) reduces to
A∗ = c−y0R−1 . In other words, in this special case without the growth component the level of equi-
librium aggregate wealth is independent of induced uncertainty. The intuition behind this result
is as follows. As we have discussed in the last section, the consumption function, (50), implies
that induced uncertainty measured by Π affects individual saving behavior via two opposing
channels: −MPCη ŝt (MPCη = R−11−Π ) and PS = Πc1−Π because
∂(−MPCη)
∂Π < 0 and
∂(PS)
∂Π > 0. When
there is no income growth, these two effects cancel out in general equilibrium and thus induced
uncertainty has no effect on aggregate wealth accumulation.
38These parameter values are chosen based on stylized facts in US annual data on aggregate income.
39This pattern is robust for different parameter values.
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7. Conclusion
This paper has provided a characterization of the consumption-savings behavior of agents who
have a preference for robustness (worries about model misspecification) and limited information-
processing ability. After obtaining the optimal individual decisions, we explore how two types
of induced uncertainty, state uncertainty due to RI and model uncertainty due to RB, affect con-
sumption and saving decisions as well as the market prices of uncertainty. Specifically, we show
that different types of about model misspecification – (i) concerns about the disturbances to the
perceived permanent income and (ii) concerns about the Kalman gain – can have opposite ef-
fects on consumption, savings, and asset prices via interacting with finite capacity in the control
and filtering problems. In addition, we show that once allowing RB consumers to use the robust
Kalman filter to update the perceived state, the simple observational equivalence (OE) between
RB and RS obtained in Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) and Luo and Young (2010) no longer
holds; instead, we find a more complicated OE between RB and RS. Finally, we explore how the
two types of informational frictions affect the market price of risk and aggregate wealth accumu-
lation.
8. Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
8.1. Solving the Two-Player Game Version of the Robust Model
To solve the Bellman equation (23) subject to (21), ŝt+1 = Rŝt − ct + ωηwt + ηt+1, we conjecture
that
v (ŝt) = −C− Bŝt − Aŝ2t , (81)
where A, B, and C are constants to be determined. Substituting this guessed value function into
the Bellman equation (23) gives
−C− Bŝt − Aŝ2t = maxct minwt
{
−1
2
(ct − c)2 + βEt
[
ϑ˜0w2t − C− Bŝt+1 − Aŝ2t+1
]}
, (82)
where ϑ˜0 = ϑ0/2. We can do the min and max operations in any order, so we choose to do the
minimization first. The first-order condition for wt is
2ϑνt − 2AEt
(
ωηwt + Rŝt − ct
)
ωη − Bωη = 0,
which means that
wt =
B + 2A (Rŝt − ct)
2
(
ϑ˜0 − Aω2η
) ωη . (83)
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Substituting (83) back into (82) gives
−Aŝ2t − Bŝt−C = maxct
−12 (c− ct)2 + βEt
ϑ˜0
B + 2A (Rst − ct)
2
(
ϑ− Aω2η
) ωη
2 − As2t+1 − Bst+1 − C

 ,
where ŝt+1 = Rŝt − ct +ωηwt + ηt+1. The first-order condition for ct is
(c− ct)− 2βϑ˜0 Aωη
ϑ− Aω2η
wt + 2βA
(
1+
Aω2η
ϑ˜0 − Aω2η
) (
Rŝt − ct +ωηwt
)
+ βB
(
1+
Aω2η
ϑ˜0 − Aω2η
)
= 0.
Using the solution for νt the solution for consumption is
ct =
2AβR
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt +
c
(
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0
)
+ βB
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
.
Substituting the above expressions into the Bellman equation gives
− Aŝ2t − Bŝt − C
= −1
2
(
2AβR
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt +
−2βAc + βB
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
)2
+
βϑ˜0ω
2
η(
2
(
ϑ˜0 − Aω2η
))2
2AR
(
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0
)
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt + B−
2c
(
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0
)
A + 2βAB
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
2
− βA

 R
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt −
−Bω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2c + 2Bβ
2
(
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
)
2 +ω2η

− βB
 R
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
ŝt −
−Bω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2c + 2Bβ
2
(
1− Aω2η/ϑ˜0 + 2βA
)
− βC.
Collecting and matching terms, the constant coefficients turn out to be
A =
βR2 − 1
2β−ω2η/ϑ˜0
, B =
(
βR2 − 1) c
(R− 1)
(
ω2η/
(
ϑ˜0
)
− β
) ,
C =
R
(
βR2 − 1)
2
(
βR− Rω2η/ϑ˜0
)
(R− 1)2
(
(R− 1)ω2η + c2
)
,
where ϑ˜0 = ϑ0/2. When βR = 1, we obtain the consumption function (24) in the text.
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8.2. Solving the Multiplier Preference Version of the RB Model
To solve the Bellman equation (30) subject to (18), we conjecture that
v (ŝt) = −C− Bŝt − Aŝ2t , (84)
where A, B, and C are constants to be determined. We can then evaluate Et [exp (−αv (ŝt+1))] to
obtain
Et [exp (−αv (ŝt+1))]
= Et
[
exp
(
αAŝ2t+1 + αBŝt+1 + αC
)]
= Et
[
exp
(
αA (Rŝt − ct)2 + αB (Rŝt − ct) + [2αA (Rŝt − ct) + αB] ηt+1 + αAη2t+1 + αC
)]
= (1− 2c)−1/2 exp
(
a +
b2
2 (1− 2c)
)
,
where α = 1/ϑ0,
a = αA (Rŝt − ct)2 + αB (Rŝt − ct) + αC,
b = [2αA (Rŝt − ct) + αB]ωη ,
c = αAω2η .
Thus, the distorted expectations operator can be written as
Rt [v (ŝt+1)] = −1
α
{
−1
2
log (1− 2c) + a + b
2
2 (1− 2c)
}
=
1
2α
log
(
1− 2αAω2η
)
− A
1− 2αAω2η
(Rŝt − ct)2 − B1− 2αAω2η
(Rŝt − ct)−
C + αB2ω2η
2
(
1− 2αAω2ζ
)
 .
(85)
Maximizing the RHS of (85) with respect to ct yields the first-order condition
− (ct − c) + 2βA1− 2αAω2η
(Rŝt − ct) + Bβ1− 2αAω2η
= 0,
which means that
ct =
2AβR
1− 2αAω2η + 2Aβ
ŝt +
c
(
1− 2αAω2η
)
+ Bβ
1− 2αAω2η + 2Aβ
. (86)
Substituting (86) and (84) into (59), and collecting and matching terms, the constant coeffi-
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cients turn out to be
A =
βR2 − 1
2β− 2αω2η
, (87)
B =
(
βR2 − 1) c
(R− 1)
(
αω2η − β
) , (88)
C =
1
2
βR2 − 1
(R− 1)2
(
β− αω2η
) c2 − β
1− β
1
α
ln
(
1−
(
βR2 − 1) αRω2η
βR− αRω2η
)
,
where α = 1/ϑ0. Setting βR = 1, substituting (87) and (88) into (86) yields the consumption
function (31) in the text.
8.3. Deriving the Stochastic Properties of Individual Consumption and Saving
8.3.1. Deriving the Volatility of Consumption
Given that
ct = ρ1ct−1 +
R− 1
1−Π
[
θζt
1− ρ2 · L + θ
(
ξt − θRξt−11− ρ2 · L
)]
,
ct can be rewritten as
ct = θ
R− 1
1−Π
ζt + (ξt − Rξt−1)
(1− ρ1 · L) (1− ρ2 · L) .
Taking the unconditional variance on both sides yields
var (ct) = var
(
θ
R− 1
1− Σ
ζt + (ξt − Rξt−1)
(1− ρ1 · L) (1− ρ2 · L)
)
=
(
θ
R− 1
1− Σ
)2 ∞
∑
k=0

[
k
∑
j=0,j≤k
(
ρ
k−j
1 ρ
j
2
)2]
ω2ζ +
[
k
∑
j=0,j≤k
(
ρ
k−j
1 ρ
j
2
)
− R
k−1
∑
j=0,j≤k−1
(
ρ
k−1−j
1 ρ
j
2
)]2
ω2ξ
 .
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8.3.2. Deriving the Variance of Individual Saving under RB-RI
Given (56) in the text, we can derive the variance of individual saving (d) as follows:
var (dt) = var
(−Π (R− 1)
1−Π
(
bt − b
)
+
(
1− R− 1
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
)
(yt − y) + ςt+1
)
= var
(
(1− ρ) ζt
1− ρ · L +
Γζt
1− ρs · L +
R− 1
1−Π
(
(1− θ) ζt
1− ρθ · L −
θξt
1− ρθ · L
))
= (1− ρ)2 ω
2
ζ
1− ρ2 + Γ
2
ω2ζ
1− ρ2s
+
(
R− 1
1−Π
)2
var
(
(1− θ) ζt
1− ρθ · L −
θξt
1− ρθ · L
)
+ 2 cov
(
(1− ρ) ζt
1− ρ · L ,
Γζt
1− ρs · L
)
+ 2 cov
(
(1− ρ) ζt
1− ρ · L ,
R− 1
1−Π
(
(1− θ) ζt
1− ρθ · L −
θξt
1− ρθ · L
))
+ 2 cov
(
Γζt
1− ρs · L ,
R− 1
1−Π
(
(1− θ) ζt
1− ρθ · L −
θξt
1− ρθ · L
))
=

1−ρ
1+ρ +
Γ2
1−ρ2s +
( R−1
1−Π
)2 [ (1−θ)2
1−ρ2θ
+ θλ
2
1−ρ2θ
1
(1/(1−θ)−R2)
]
+ 2(1−ρ)Γ1−ρρs +
( R−1
1−Π
) 2(1−ρ)(1−θ)
1−ρρθ +
( R−1
1−Π
) 2Γ(1−θ)
1−ρsρθ
ω2ζ ,
which is just (58) in the text.
8.4. Computing the Market Price of Uncertainty
Given the value function we obtained in Section (2.2),
v (ŝt) = Ω
(
ŝt − cR− 1
)2
+ ρ, (89)
where Ω = −R(R−1)2(1−Π) and ρ = ϑ02(R−1) ln
(
1− (R−1)Π1−Π
)
, it follows from Jacobson (1973) and HST
(1999) that the risk-sensitivity operator can be written as
Rt [v̂ (ŝt+1)] = −ϑ0 log Et [exp (−v̂ (ŝt+1) /ϑ0)]
= Ω̂
(
ŝt − cR− 1
)2
+ ρ̂,
where
Ω̂ = ρ2sΩ
(
1− 2
ϑ0
Ωω2η
(
1+
2
ϑ0
Ωω2η
)−1)
= −R (R− 1) (1− RΠ)
2 (1−Π)2
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and
ρ̂ = ρ+
ϑ0
2
ln
(
1+
2
ϑ0
Ωω2η
)
=
ϑ0
2 (R− 1) ln
(
1− 2 (R− 1)Π
1−Π
)
+
ϑ0
2
ln
(
1− (R− 1)Π
(1−Π)
)
,
where we assume that 2(R−1)Π1−Π < 1.
Given that
mrst,t+1 ≡
exp (−vt+1/ϑ0)
Et [exp (−vt+1/ϑ0)] =
exp
(− (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)
exp
(
−
(
Ω̂ŝ2t + ρ̂
)
/ϑ0
) ,
we have
(
mrst,t+1
)2
=
exp(−2(Ωŝ2t+1+ρ)/ϑ0)
exp(−2(Ω̂ŝ2t+ρ̂)/ϑ0)
. Multiplying the numerator and denominator by the
time t conditional mean of the exponential term in the numerator, Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)],
gives (
mrst,t+1
)2
=
Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)]
exp
(
−2
(
Ω̂ŝ2t + ρ̂
)
/ϑ0
) exp (−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)
Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)] ,
where the exponential term, Et
[
exp
(
σ
(
Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ
))]
, can be computed using a formula found in
Jacobson (1973):
Et
[
exp
(−2 (Ωŝ2t+1 + ρ) /ϑ0)] = exp(−2(Ω˜ŝ2t + ρ˜) /ϑ0) ,
where
Ω˜ = ρ2sΩ
(
1− 4
ϑ0
Ωω2η
(
1+
4
ϑ0
Ωω2η
)−1)
=
Rρ2sΩ
R + 4ΩΠ
,
ρ˜ = ρ+
ϑ0
4
ln
(
1+
1
ϑ0
Ωω2η
)
= ρ+
ϑ0
4
ln
(
1− 2 (R− 1)Π
(1−Π)
)
.
Therefore, we obtain
Et
[(
mrst,t+1
)2]
= exp
(
−2
((
Ω˜− Ω̂
)
ŝ2t + (ρ˜− ρ̂)
)
/ϑ0
)
,
which yields (72) in the main text.
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8.5. Deriving Aggregate Wealth Accumulation
Substituting (50) into (5), we have
bt+1 − bt
= (R− 1) bt + yt −
(
R− 1
1−Π ŝt −
Πc
1−Π
)
= (R− 1) bt + yt −
[
R− 1
1−Π
(
bt +
1
R− ρyt +
1
(R− g) (R− ρ) xt
)
− Πc
1−Π
]
+
R− 1
1−Π (st − ŝt)
=
−Π (R− 1)
1−Π bt +
(
1− R− 1
(1−Π) (R− ρ)
)
(yt − yt) +
[
1− (R− 1) (R− g + 1− ρ)
(1−Π) (R− ρ) (R− g)
]
yt
+
Πc
1−Π +
R− 1
1−Π (st − ŝt) ,
which is just (75) in the text. Note that here we use the following facts:
st ≡ bt + 1R− ρyt +
1
(R− g) (R− ρ) xt,
xt = (g− ρ) gty0, yt = gty0, yt =
g− ρ
1− ρ g
ty0.
In the steady state in which yt = yt and b and y grow at the same rate, g, (75) leads to
bt+1 = ρsbt +
[
1− (R− 1) (R− g + 1− ρ)
(1−Π) (R− ρ) (R− g)
]
yt +
Πc
1−Π ,
which reduces to bt = 1g−ρs
{[
1− (R−1)(R−g+1−ρ)
(1−Π)(R−ρ)(R−g)
]
yt +
Π
1−Π c
}
. Substituting (76) and (78) into (77)
yields[
1− (1− δ)
∞
∑
t=1
(
δt−1ρts
)]
A =
(
1− δ
1− ρs
) ∞
∑
t=1
(
δt−1
(
1− ρts
) {[
1− (R− 1) (R− g + 1− ρ)
(1−Π) (R− ρ) (R− g)
]
yt +
Πc
1−Π
})
A =
1
Π
[
1−Π
R− 1 −
R− g + 1− ρ
(R− ρ) (R− g)
]
g (g− ρ) (1− δ) (1− δρs)
(1− ρ) (1− δg) (1− δgρs)y0 +
1
R− 1c,
which is just (79) in the text. Here we use the facts that
∞
∑
t=1
(
δt−1ρts
)
=
ρs
1− δρs ,
∞
∑
t=1
[
δt−1
(
1− ρts
)]
=
1− ρs
(1− δ) (1− δρs) ,
∞
∑
s=0
s
∑
j=0
(
δsρ
s−j
s
)
=
∞
∑
s=0
δs
(
s
∑
j=0
ρ
s−j
s
)
=
1
δ (1− δρs) ,
∞
∑
t=1
[
δt−1
(
yt
1− ρts
1− ρs
)]
=
g
1− ρs
g− ρ
1− ρ
1− ρs
(1− δg) (1− δgρs)y0.
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43
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
ϑ
µ
ϑ0=1
ϑ0=1.1
ϑ0=1.2
Figure 8. Relative Volatility of Consumption to Income under RB-RI without Noise
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
µ d
θ(ϑ,κ)
ϑ0=1
ϑ0=1.1
ϑ0=1.2
Figure 9. Relative Volatility of Individual Saving
44
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
log(ϑ)
κ R
S
κRB=0.3 bits
κRB=0.6 bits
κRB=1 bit
Figure 10. The OE between RB and RS
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
p
m
ea
n(M
PU
)
θ=0.1
θ=0.2
θ=0.9
Figure 11. Effects of p on the mean of MPU for Different θ
45
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
p
m
ed
ian
(MP
U)
θ=0.1
θ=0.2
θ=0.9
Figure 12. Effects of p on the median of MPU for Different θ
0.9 0.95 1 1.05 1.1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
E[SDF]
sd
(SD
F)
U.S. data
p=0.02
p=0.05
p=0.08
p=0.11
p=0.14
p=0.17
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